PBSP’s Statement Regarding The Overthrow Of The Hasina Government And The Circumstances That Followed

(For circulation in all levels of the party and the politically conscious circles outside)

August 11, 2024

-[originally published in Bengali. Unofficial English Translation by Supporters of Maoists in Bangladesh]

1. The Situation

1.1 The Hasina-Awami fascist government fell on August 5 in a popular uprising of students and
the masses. People of various political forces, classes, professions, and communities—including
covert and overt, revolutionary, progressive, reformist, and bourgeois—have fought continuously
over the past 15 years and this victory is a continuation of that.

The ministers had started to escape a day prior. They smelled change through the military
bureaucrats and especially the US imperialists. This was also evident in the call for midterm
elections made by Dr. Yunus, the trusted bourgeois economist for the Western imperialists residing
abroad. Hasina was forced to depart as a result of the army and bureaucrats withdrawing their
support from her under the pressure of this mass uprising and by using Dr. Yunus as an interim
head of state.

Hasina ultimately hoped that the military and bureaucracy would continue to support her. If that
were the case, she could have survived, albeit with a lot of bloodshed. This was seen in the initial
phase as the movement subsided (after July 20), after the army was deployment and curfew was
placed. India and China had directly expressed relief about Hasina’s survival at that time. But some
incidents (reckless armed attacks on students and masses by Chhatra League terrorists and police-
RAB-BGB; the killings of numerous children and youth by indiscriminate and mass shootings;
thousands injured by bullets; strong opposition from professionals and the civil society; the arrest
of student leaders, only to be forced to release them, etc.) reawakened the movement. Especially
after July 17, the huge and active participation of all political parties, including the main bourgeois
parties, BNP and Jamaat, in the movement to overthrow Hasina made the movement unstoppable
and violent. BNP and Jamaat, with effective tactics, put all their efforts under the student banner.
They were able to bring various sectors of professionals to connect with them. Even a small number
of influential media outlets continued to run significant anti-Hasina campaigns. The preexisting
rift within different factions of the ruling class, particularly among professionals and NGOs,
deepened significantly. This division further intensified when ex-military bureaucrats openly
opposed the regime. As a result, conflict emerged within the military bureaucracy. Under
mounting internal pressures and external influences—especially from Western powers, including
the US—even though the army chief and several key figures were aligned with Hasina—they
ultimately transported her by helicopter to India for her safety.

1.2 On the night of August 8, an apparent civilian “interim government” was formed at the
initiative of the army and bureaucrats. The head is Dr. Yunus, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate who
was persecuted by Hasina during the latter part of her term, and is very close to the Western
imperialists. Those initially placed in his government are mainly Western-backed ex-military
civilian bureaucrats, civil society representatives, NGO officials, and some bourgeois or reformist professionals/intellectuals. Almost all of them belong to the ruling class. That is why they have
declared allegiance to the constitution that allowed Hasina-fascism and vowed to protect the
existing system. It also glorifies the ongoing judicial system supported by fascism by making some
personnel changes to the Supreme Court.

1.3 The main force behind the 15-year-long struggle against Hasina’s fascism—the people from
various classes and professions—is not represented in this government. Those on the student
committee who joined this government and implemented their current program, did so without
seeking approval from the general student body or consulting the various political student
organizations. Additionally, none of the several political forces that played a crucial role in toppling
fascism over the past fifteen years are represented. Just a day after the uprising, the student
committee leaders, who lack political awareness, called upon bourgeois figures trusted by Western
imperialism to oppose Hasina. At the same time, they unilaterally announced a proposed interim
government without consulting or involving all parties who were part of this massive and
prolonged movement. In doing so, they have effectively handed over the outcomes of the student
movement and the uprising to the “third power” that the ruling class had been alluding to.1

1.4 Many of the other major political forces, including the BNP, have seemingly supported or
accepted this government, driven by the hope that this change will position them to form the next
government in the upcoming election. However, coalitions of anti-US factions and reformist
leftists were neither included nor consulted. In contrast, Western-oriented groups like Jamaat and
other religious forces have been welcomed. This alignment reveals the political vision and direction
of the new government.

1.5 US imperialism has supported the new government, while Russia has distanced itself by
labeling the situation as “internal affairs.” China, which had previously backed Hasina’s regime,
now finds itself in a precarious position. They are closely monitoring the developments of the new
government, which is heavily reliant on the US and the West. However, after the government was
established, China felt some relief and, after a waiting period, also extended its congratulations to
the new leadership.

In contrast, Hasina’s masters, the Indian expansionists, are reacting strongly to her ousting. They
have provided refuge to the fleeing Hasina and are conspiring with her on the next steps. India has
declared a near state of war along the border. They have been shedding crocodile tears over the
alleged extermination of Hindus and are attempting to incite communal riots. These actions are
intended either to stage a counter-coup against the new rulers through their agents, to secure their
own interests, or to pressure the opposition into compromising. They have already congratulated
Dr. Yunus as part of these efforts.

1.6 The parliament elected through Hasina’s fraudulent election last January has already been
dissolved. Despite this, key institutions such as the presidency, judiciary, administration,
secretariat, bureaucracy, media, elite business circles, police, and the army remain largely under the
influence of the ousted fascists. Many members of these groups are either in hiding or gradually
aligning themselves with the new rulers. However, the new regime is consolidating its power by
reshuffling some of these individuals into top positions.

Additionally, there are efforts to promote conservative religious organizations like Jamaat. At the
same time, anti-social elements and certain reactionary factions are engaging in human rights
violations against civilians and people who have committed no crimes. While there have been some
attacks on Hindus and religious-ethnic minorities, these incidents are not widespread. However,
Indian authorities are exaggerating these events as part of their broader conspiracy.

1.7 The leaders of the main bourgeois party, the BNP, are already attempting to manage the chaos
within the state and the ruling class. They are calling for peace and promoting a non-retaliatory
stance, echoing the familiar rhetoric of middle-class power and politically naive student leaders.
However, during the later stages of the previous movement, student mobs turned violent—a trend
that has persisted even after Hasina’s downfall. This unrest is evident in the prison revolts occurring
across the country, by inmates, political prisoners, and students who are all victims of the Hasina
regime.

The student leadership, however, has openly condemned this justified violent movement of the
people, advocating for non-violence. Yet, without this justified violence, Hasina’s fascist
government would not have been overthrown. Unfortunately, in the absence of proper leadership,
this justified violence has also led to anarchy. Without power in the hands of the people or the
means for them to arm themselves, various anti-social and reactionary political forces are now
exploiting the situation for their own gain.

1.8 In this top-down power shift, the student leadership aligned with the pro-Western bourgeoisie,
resulting in a portion of the student body being diverted from the central issue of state power to
roles such as traffic police and cleaning crews in the capital. While this reflects a public service
mindset, tolerance, and willingness to sacrifice, the crucial question is which politics they are
ultimately serving. By keeping students away from the central issue of state power and involving
them in reformist, Gandhian activities, their potential, struggle spirit, and political enthusiasm are
being undermined.

They are caught up in abstract promises of building a new, discrimination-free Bangladesh, with
some even calling it a revolution—Dr. Yunus included. This rhetoric is supported by many in the
bourgeois and middle-class educated sectors. However, beneath these abstract claims, they are
assisting the system in managing the crisis. They oppose arming the people, disbanding oppressive
forces, or creating grassroots organizations of people’s power. Instead, they focus on repairing the
crisis and distress of the old system, with no specific basic political program for change. This
reactionary depoliticization is being glorified, with the current discourse amounting to state-
reformist gibberish, often endorsed by various revisionist factions.

Thus, the student and mass struggle has not achieved fundamental results. The general student
community desires change but lacks clarity on what that change should be or how to achieve it.
This uncertainty will likely lead to disillusionment, with the more politically aware students seeking
new alternatives. Additionally, some student leaders are becoming autocratic, limiting space for
other political student organizations and declaring universities “politics-free.” However, this so-
called politics-free environment is merely a guise for participating in reactionary state power, with
Yunus and his leadership at the center of this “Third Power” politics.

1.9 The main duty of this government is to fill the power vacuum left by Hasina and to restore
peace and order. And later (though it’s not sure how much later), to hold an election. However, the old state system remains intact, although due to the bloody departure of the previous rulers, there has been considerable damage and instability to the state apparatus and a section of the ruling class. Although almost all the upper echelons of the ruling elite are physically unharmed, some of their assets have been damaged and many of them have been forced to flee the country for the time being or go into hiding. They are largely in a state of panic and disarray, especially due to the many attacks on the police force. But the ruling class is quickly mending their wounds. The formation of an interim government is a part of that process.

1.10 They claim they will hold an election and hand over power to an elected government.
However, no timeline has been announced by this government yet. There will be pressure on them
to make quick decisions. In particular, the main bourgeois party, BNP, is applying pressure, hoping
to form the government if elections are held.

The formation of this interim government has also created a constitutional crisis for the ruling
class. Bourgeois jurists are trying to resolve it and provide some form of codification, but it is not
simple. This crisis is significant for the ruling class and the state apparatus, potentially intensifying
conflicts between different factions. Even the ousted Hasina-fascism as well as India could exploit
this situation to strengthen their conspiracy. Already, former Prime Minister Hasina’s son, Sajib
Joy, from his position in the US, has announced that Hasina has not resigned and is still the Prime
Minister. He calls the current government legally illegitimate and suggests that there is scope for
legal action against it. At the same time, he is accusing the current administration of human rights
violations against Awami supporters.

2. Possible Future Scenarios

2.1 The rhetoric appealing to the educated middle class—such as “New Independence,” “Second
Liberation War,” “Disparity-Free,” “Prosperous and Peaceful Bangladesh,” or “Liberation”—will
not endure for long. While the majority of workers, farmers, and poor people are relieved by the
fall of the Hasina-fascists, they do not have high expectations for the current government. They
are not as enthusiastic as some in the educated middle class. The underlying crisis of the existing
system will soon become apparent, and both imperialist powers and India will likely seek to exploit
it.

2.2. A government formed unilaterally without representing all the forces of the movement,
especially the common people including the workers/peasants/poor, is an imperialist-loyal,
military-backed “Third Power” government. On the one hand, it gets the ostensible approval of
the ruling class; on the other hand, the infighting between them on this question will develop.
The BNP is demanding elections within three months, but there is significant doubt as to whether
this government will comply. Civil society, “third powers,” and even the so-called left forces are
divided on this issue.

If elections are held soon, conflicts are likely to escalate among the various factions. Conversely, if
elections are not held within the demanded time frame, many forces, including the BNP, will be
disgruntled, leading to increased conflict.

The tension between the military elements of the Third Power and the civilian populace will also
rise, making a direct power grab by army officials a possibility.

Imperialist powers and India will continue to plot to tighten their control, with their domestic
proxies involved.

The fallen fascists, by surviving the first blow, will persist in their conspiracy and non-cooperation
with loyalists in various state and societal sectors. After the initial shock, the new government will
likely be compelled to compromise with them to some extent due to class concerns.

The occupation imposed by the Awami fascists on various societal sectors will simply change hands.
Although this shift may not be immediately obvious or visible, the process has already begun.

The infighting between the current rulers and various ruling-class factions will intensify over
whether the Awami League will be allowed to participate in the new bourgeois process, or the issue
of Jamaat.

Thus, if this government persists for an extended period, the likelihood of resignation or opposition
will increase likewise.

2.3 It is not possible for such a third-power government to bring relief to the common people by
controlling the prices of goods. It is not possible for them to initiate any positive program for the
workers, farmers, and poor people. This was proven in the past, in 2007–08.2 They have effectively
suppressed the struggle of all democratic, progressive, and revolutionary political forces against the
Hasina fascists that had continued for the past 15 years, focusing only on the recent movement.
As a result, they are neither releasing all political prisoners from the past 15 years nor withdrawing
all cases. They do not care about the working peasants and the poor people. They are inflating the
glory of the anti-discrimination students for their own class and group interests.3 The class and
state apparatus they are serving will never be able to deal with the country’s ongoing economic
crisis, because they are merely servants of the same system, agents of imperialism. Only the faces
have changed, with a different faction of the ruling class taking power.

Due to these reasons, they will not be able to gain the trust of the core masses. The movement of
different sections of the people will also continue.

2.4 Due to these reasons, it is highly unlikely that the situation will stabilize in the future. Instead,
the various sides in power will likely engage in serious conflict among themselves. At the same
time, conscious students, youth, and the general middle class will soon lose hope. Particularly,
working people will see no improvement in their lives, leading to a resurgence of their frustration,
distrust, and struggle. The fallen fascists will attempt to exploit this discontent once again.

Thus, the so-called reform slogans of the existing system will not yield any meaningful results for
the country and its people. New dictatorships will likely emerge to replace the old fascists.

Regardless of what happens, the existing system will remain in place, and the lives of workers,
peasants, the poor, and even the broader middle class will not change. The promises of a beautiful, peaceful, and prosperous Bangladesh will remain distant. It will soon become clear that the old
system persists, merely with a new face.

3. Some Lessons from this Uprising

3.1 The most important lesson from this movement is that while students, due to their youth and
fighting spirit, played a crucial role in the struggle, their middle-class character exposed their
political weaknesses.

This student movement started around their own problems. They themselves termed it
“apolitical,” which was the biggest political weakness of this movement.

However, as the anger of the people and various political forces, suppressed by Hasina-fascism for
15 years, surged into a fierce rebellion, the student leadership was compelled to adopt political
demands. Ultimately, the movement aimed to overthrow Hasina.

However, the one-point movement is limited to altering the personnel and the government. Essentially it is the temporary removal of the ruling fascists from their place of prominence. Despite this positive political stance, the student-leadership does not have any specific program or guidelines for its implementation. The third power elites are and will try to use this weakness to implement their own agendas.

3.2 The working class also participated in this movement and uprising, as seen in other rightful
and militant struggles. However, the movement failed to attract the urban working class, let alone
the rural farmers. In reality, the student leadership and BNP-Jamaat had no such goal. This was
another great political weakness of this movement. In fact, due to the so-called apolitical rhetoric
of this movement, which was supported by the educated middle class and the bourgeoisie, no
special agenda for the workers, peasants and the poor people emerged in this movement. As a
result, the anti-Hasina bourgeoisie has easily absorbed the outcomes of this uprising.

In this way, this movement and uprising were politically far behind the mass uprising of 1969, and
even the struggle and uprising against the military dictatorship of Ershad in the 1980s. But in
terms of militancy and violence against the state apparatus, this uprising surpassed the previous
uprisings. The student leadership has openly condemned and refused to take responsibility for this
aspect of the movement. This proves that the society and the current political climate no longer
support significant political change, let alone bringing a revolutionary change, through peaceful
movements alone.

3.3 The agenda of the urban workers, the poor, and the rural peasants must be highlighted, and
they must be included in any future mass movement and uprising. In effect, revolutionary political
leadership of the working class must be ensured. At the same time, the masses should be made
aware of revolutionary politics and popular uprisings should be turned into planned armed
uprisings centered on seizing state power.

It is only through this that the sacrifice of the students and the masses can be made successful, and
to make it impossible for the bourgeoisie, the lackeys of imperialism, to sustain the existing system.

Central Committee, Proletarian Party of Purbo Bangla

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1 Third power refers to a different block of power, not united behind a party, but distinct from other power blocks, e.g., BNP/Jamat and Hasina/Awami.

2 In 2007-2008 a military backed government led by Fakhruddin-Moinuddin took power and ruled Bangladesh.

3 “Anti-discrimination” is the label the initial student protesters against the increased quota for workers in the public sector took.